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Any policy of deferral to private dispute resolution processes
must begin, we believe, by recognizing the difference between
rights which parties, by private action, have created for
themselves and rights which find their source in the law.
In our original Article,1 we criticized the National Labor
Relations Board (NLRB or Board) for generating rules
governing deference to private arbitral remedies without
recognizing this distinction.2 The Board refuses to intercede
when employers have been charged with violating employees'
specific statutory rights, simply because the employee may
also utilize an arbitral mechanism designed to enforce not
statutory rights, but the privately created standards of
conduct set forth in a collective-bargaining agreement.
Moreover, as we argued in our original Article, the Board
does so without making an adequate inquiry into whether, in
a particular instance, the arbitral remedies provide even a
minimal guarantee that the same standards of conduct will
be applied in the private process as would be applied in an
action before the Board to enforce statutory rights.3
We also pointed out that the Board has established an
entirely different rule when a union, rather than an employer,
is accused of illegal conduct.4 Thus, in the context of duty-of-
fair-representation charges, the Board refuses to defer to a
union's internal procedures because the issue involves a legal
* Associate General Counsel, InternationalUnion, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). B.A., University ofMichigan,
1965; M.B.A., University of Michigan, 1968; J.D., Detroit College of Law, 1972.
** Associate General Counsel, InternationalUnion, United Automobile, Aerospace
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW). B.A., Yale University, 1980;
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, 1984.
The views expressed are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the
International Union, UAW.
1. Leonard Page & Daniel W. Sherrick, The NLRB's Deferral Policy and Union
Reform: A Union Perspective, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 647 (1991).
2. Id. at 653-54.
3. Id. at 655.
4. Id at 684.
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standard of conduct and "does not ... involve a dispute
between contracting parties over the interpretation of a
provision in the contract."5
Finally, we criticized the Board for developing this double
standard of mandating great deference when an employer is
the defendant, but refusing to defer when a union is charged
with improper conduct. We argued briefly that there are
strong, policy-based justifications for deferring to an internal
union procedure when considering duty-of-fair-representation
allegations.6 We did not, however, attempt to assert a
reverse double standard that would grant unions broader
deference. We outlined the pro-deferral arguments in the
duty of fair representation context only to show that there is
no basis for the Board's double standard. We did not intend
to depart from our basic statutory/contractual rights distinc-
tion in making those arguments. Instead, we merely wished
to point out that the Board's double standard neither comports
with this crucial distinction nor flows from any policy-based
5. Western Conference of Teamsters, 251 N.L.R.B. 331, 338 n.31 (1980). A
sharply divided Board first decided in Miranda Fuel Co., Inc. that § 8(b)(1XA) of the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)(A), prohibits labor organizations,
when acting in a statutory representative capacity, from taking action against any
employee on the basis of classifications or considerations which are invidious,
irrelevant, or unfair. See 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d
172 (2d Cir. 1963). In addition, the Board stated that an employer violates § 8(aX1) of
the Act to the extent that it participates in the union's arbitrary action against an
employee. See id. at 185-86. Because these are violations of the Act, they come within
the Board's jurisdiction. As the Supreme Court later explained, the Board in Miranda
for the first time interpreted a breach of a union's duty of fair representation as an
unfair labor practice. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171,177 (1967). Although the Second
Circuit refused to enforce Miranda, see 326 F.2d at 180, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
decision, see Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v.
N.L.R.B., 368 F.2d 12, 19-20 (5th Cir. 1966). The Supreme Court has declined to
decide the correctness of the Board's decision. See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 170 (1983). More recently, the Court indicated what might
be a growing acceptance of the Miranda doctrine, at least when considering charges un-
der § 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act involving alleged breaches of the
duty of fair representation in the hiring hall context. The Court noted that the decision
in Miranda was an attempt by the Board to broaden the remedies available to union
members by finding that breaches of the duty of fair representation were also unfair
labor practices. The Court refused to limit the scope of the duty to the unfair labor
practices specified in § 8(b). See Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local
Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67, 86-87 (1989). In Vaca v. Sipes, the Court held that the
Board's assertion of jurisdiction over duty-of-fair-representation claims does not
preempt federal court jurisdiction over such claims. See 386 U.S. at 180-88.
6. Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 684-87.
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distinctions that would justify lower levels of deference to union
procedures than to contractual arbitration proceedings.7
Both Professor Theodore St. Antoine, in his Introduction to
the original Symposium, and Paul Levy, in his Response in
this issue, have responded to our observations! We had not
expected our observations to cause such reaction. We
believed them to be relatively straightforward: that the
Board should apply the distinction between contractual and
statutory rights to charges against both unions and employ-
ers. It simply makes no sense for the Board to ignore that
distinction to shield employers from agency scrutiny-as it
did in Olin Corp.9 and United Technologies Corp.10 -but not
to show the same respect for union procedures.
Although we believe that both Levy and Professor St.
Antoine thus misread the intentions of our original Article,
we now accept their challenge and will attempt to justify a
deferral analysis that recognizes the distinction between
statutory and contractual rights, but nevertheless results in
deferral to internal union procedures in many instances
where duty-of-fair-representation allegations are involved.
The analysis that we propose would not, however, result in
deferral to contractual arbitration mechanisms in the face of
allegations of many types of illegal conduct by employers.
7. Both the union and the employer can be named as defendants in "hybrid"
§ 301/duty-of-fair-representation suits. See, e.g., Vaca, 386 U.S. at 186-87. In that
context, requiring exhaustion of internal union mechanisms would forestall the action
against both the employer and the union, a result the Supreme Court has rejected. See
Clayton v. UAW, 451 U.S. 679, 695 (1981). Similarly, if the results of that private
process are to be given weight in subsequent agency or judicial proceedings, both the
employer and the union should be equally bound by the determination. We believe that
the Board should apply a similarly even-handed rule when duty-of-fair-representation
allegations against the union under § 8(b)(1XA) of the National Labor Relations Act,
29 U.S.C. § 158(bX1XA) (1988), and breach of contract allegations against the employer,
are joined in a Board proceeding. In short, if the agency gives weight to the results of
private processes in determining whether statutory violations have occurred, the same
rule should apply to both unions and employers.
8. See Paul A. Levy, Deferral to the Intraunion Appellate Process: A Response, 25
U. MICH. J.L. REF. 907 (1992); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Introduction to Symposium, The
Government and Union Democracy, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 469,475 (1991) ("toward the
end of the Page-Sherrick piece, the demands of special pleading seem to become too
much to resist."). Professor St. Antoine also claims that our argument that the NLRB
should require an employee to exhaust a union's internal remedies before formally
charging that the union has breached its duty of fair representation "tend[s] to diminish
the force of the earlier argument" that deferral is inappropriate when the employer is
charged with violation of statutory rights. Id.
9. 268 N.L.R.B. 573 (1984).
10. 268 N.L.R.B. 557 (1984).
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We would first like to respond to one aspect of Levy's Arti-
cle1' before discussing our proposal. Levy seems to argue as
a general matter that "joint committee" determinations
should not receive the same deference as arbitral resolu-
tions. 2 After establishing some of the basic analytic parame-
ters in Part I of this Response, we argue in Part II that
Levy's distinction between joint committees and arbitral
resolutions has no relevance to disputes concerning contrac-
tual rights, and is useful only in the context of disputes
concerning statutory rights. In Part III, we outline a
framework for analyzing internal union review procedures
that will establish-without ignoring the distinction between
statutory and contractual rights-the case for deference to
internal union procedures when the union is accused of
having breached its duty of fair representation.
Before proceeding any further, we feel compelled to engage
in a measure of responsive "special pleading." In a footnote
to his Response, Levy notes the "common assumption that
the UAW, if not perfect, [is] at least far more democratic and
tolerant of dissent than most other national unions."' 3 Levy
then indicates that certain recent events have caused him to
"wonder whether the [UAW] is ... simply more lucky and
better at co-opting dissent" than other unions. 4 The events
to which Levy makes reference involve several election
contests in recent years. We take this occasion to reject his
suggestion firmly and to reaffirm the UAW's abiding commit-
ment to the democratic rights of the membership. However,
we have agreed that, rather than divert attention from the
topic at hand with a lengthy debate about the state of
democracy within the UAW and disputes about how to
characterize various events and the authority that reports
them, we will simply note our disagreement in this regard.15
11. Paul A. Levy, Deferral and the Dissident, 24 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 479 (1991).
12. See id at 560-61.
13. Levy, supra note 8, at 911 n.27.
14. Id.
15. We also must respond briefly to Levy's assertion that the UAW may simply be
better at "co-opting dissent." See id. The unstated premise of this claim is that dissent
is a natural and unavoidable fact of life. It ignores completely the possibility that
dissent may be minimized not because it is "co-opted," but because the elected
representative is responsive to the needs of the constituency. It seems to us that a lack
of organized dissent may be a sign of the health of an organization; it may be a
symptom of nothing more sinister than the fact that the elected representatives are
well regarded and that the members believe that their representatives are carrying out
their functions effectively. In short, no matter how deeply one values democracy, there
[VOL. 25:3 & 4
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One other prefatory remark is in order. The NLRB has
embraced very recently a modest form of deferral in the
context of a particular type of duty-of-fair-representation
case. The Supreme Court held in Communication Workers v.
Beck16 that the duty of fair representation places limits on
the ability of a union to assess dues or fees from objecting
nonmembers."7 Compliance with the Beck decision thus re-
quires that unions report expenditures by category so that
the appropriate reduction in such fees, if any, can be deter-
mined. In addition, objecting nonmembers are provided with
the right to challenge the union's calculations in this regard.
All of these rights and obligations find their source in the
duty of fair representation.
The NLRB recently issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking regarding compliance with Beck. i" In that
proposal, the Board endorsed deferral to a private arbitral
proceeding "where an employee's Board charge concerns only
the accuracy of ... [the] financial data" supplied by the
union." In addition, the Board stated that it rejected a
broader form of deferral in this context because it would not
be "prudent to provide for deferral on a whole range of issues
which the Board itself has not as yet considered."2 ° Even this
very limited form of deferral, however, represents a depar-
ture from the Board's previously absolute anti-deferral policy
in the context of duty-of-fair-representation charges. It is
impossible to speculate whether this departure is evidence of
a more general realization that deferral may in fact be
applied more broadly in duty-of-fair-representation cases.
I. ANALYTIC FOUNDATIONS
Board deferral doctrine arises in two very different con-
texts. First, the Board often defers when charges under
is no reason for elected representatives to feel embarrassed by a lack of organized
dissent within a well-run and democratic organization.
16. 487 U.S. 735 (1988).
17. See id. at 762-63.
18. See 57 Fed. Reg. 43,635 (1992) (to be codified at 29 C.F.tL pt. 86) (proposed
Sept. 22, 1992).
19. Id. at 43,639.
20. Id. Such issues could include, for example, whether a particular category of
expenditure should be chargeable to an objecting nonmember.
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
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section 8(a)(5) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act)2'
are filed during the term of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment. Such charges allege, in essence, that the employer has
violated an aspect of the contractual relationship between the
employer and the representative of the employees by failing
to bargain in good faith.2  Second, the Board also defers
when charges are filed under section 8(a)(3) of the Act.
These charges allege that an employer violated the specific
statutory prohibition against "encourag[ing] or discourag[ing]
membership in any labor organization."2
A. Contractual Rights, Private Procedures,
and the Duty to Bargain
Employees or their unions often assert that employers have
violated section 8(a)(5)'s mandate to bargain in good faith
when an employer unilaterally alters a term or condition of
employment during the term of a labor agreement.24 In that
context, the alleged violation of law is the employer's unilat-
eral abrogation of standards of conduct set forth in the
contract itself. Proof of a contract violation is therefore both
necessary and sufficient to prove a violation of the applicable
legal standard.
Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) obligate the employer and the union
to bargain in good faith.' Congress has also determined,
however, that the parties are not thus thrown into a state of
constant bargaining. Once bargaining has produced a contract,
neither party is required to bargain on an issue covered by that
contract until the contract expires. 26
21. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). The National Labor Relations Act, also known as
the Wagner Act, was passed in 1935, see Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935), and
significantly amended in 1947 by the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), also
known as the Taft-Hartley Act, see Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). We adopt
the common practice, among the union-side bar at least, of referring to this law as the
NLRA or simply the Act. Only when the LMRA added an entirely new section, such
as § 203(d), do we refer to the LMRA.
22. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX5) (1988).
23. Id. § 158(aX3).
24. CHARLES J. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 950-55 (2d ed. 1983) and cases
therein.
25. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(aX5), 158(d) (1988).
26. See id. § 158(d).
[VOL 25:3 & 4
Further Thoughts on Deferral 931
When the NLRB "defers' to a contractually mandated
procedure for determining whether a contract breach (and
therefore a violation of section 8(a)(5)) has occurred, it is not
determining that a private or contractual procedure is an
adequate substitute for agency enforcement of specific statu-
tory protections. Instead, the NLRB is merely recognizing
that sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) mandate only that the parties
negotiate in good faith to reach a contract. Once a contract
has been reached, the duties imposed by these sections cease
to have any meaning apart from the enforceability of the
contract itself.27 It is entirely proper, of course, to leave the
enforcement of that contract to the parties' chosen vehicle for
contract interpretation and enforcement; no violence to
statutory protections occurs when the parties are allowed
(and obligated) to utilize their chosen means to enforce the
standards of conduct which they developed through private
negotiations.28
27. Section 8(d) states that these duties "shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in
a contract for a fixed period." 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). As we discussed at some
length in our original Article, the Board and arbitrators have had some difficulty
developing a consistent doctrine regarding the status of terms and conditions of
employment which are not covered by the contract. Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at
663-66. Thus, on the one hand, the Board has held that employers may not
unilaterally impose drug testing policies when the contract is silent on such matters.
See Johnson-Bateman Co., 295 N.L.R.B. No. 26, slip op. at 15, 25-26, 131 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1393, 1398, 1402 (June 15, 1989). But see Michigan Bell Tel. Co., 306 N.L.R.B.
No. 54, 1991-92 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 9 17,106 (Feb. 11, 1992) (concluding that because
the substance abuse policy did not modify the parties' contract and was introduced after
bargaining to impasse, the implementation did not violate § 8(a) (5)). But on the other
hand, some arbitrators have held that contractual silence on a particular topic always
means that the employer has successfully "reserved" its right to act in that area
without concern for the duty to bargain. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 664 &
n.79.
We also noted in our original Article that, in a small class of cases, the contractually
mandated procedure might not fully vindicate the statutory rights at issue. See id. at
663-66. An employer, for example, might repeatedly and intentionally breach an
existing contract, causing the union to expend its resources arbitrating frivolous cases
and diminishing the union's role in the eyes of its members. In such circumstances, we
believe that the arbitral remedy (enforcing the contract in each instance) may not
provide adequate relief from the employer misconduct, and a distinct § 8(aX5) charge
would therefore have merit. This is a very specific example, however, and does not
detract from the general point made in the text that alleged violations of § 8(a)(5) may
properly be "deferred" to private dispute resolution mechanisms because the existence
of the contract directly forecloses any ongoing duty to bargain on the areas covered by
the contract.
28. Absent a private, agreed-upon, and peaceful means of resolving such
contractual disputes, the labor agreement remains fully enforceable in federal court
pursuant to § 301 of the LMRA, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1988). Groves v. Ring Screw Works,
Ferndale Fastener Div., 111 S. Ct. 498, 502 (1990).
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
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We believe that it only confuses the issue to speak of the
"contract rights" of individual employees in this context.
Section 8(a)(5) does not confer rights on individual employ-
ees. It requires that the employer engage in bargaining with
the exclusive collective-bargaining representative of the
employees.'
Moreover, the result of that bargaining is a contract
between the union and the employer, not between the em-
ployer and employee. In general, it is the union's role both
to bargain for the contract and to enforce its terms on behalf
of the employees. The union has great discretion in making
contract enforcement decisions based, not on a myopic view
of individual rights, but on a view of the bargaining unit as
a whole.' Individual employees also have the right to
enforce the contract, but only after exhausting the bargained-
for procedures for enforcement. 1 If an individual then seeks
judicial review of that private resolution, she will be bound
by the private interpretation of the contract, and may obtain
direct review of the "merits" of the contract issue only if she can
prove that the system for private resolution malfunctioned
because the union breached its duty of fair representation. 2
Thus, the enforcement scheme for these contract rights is
firmly rooted in the union's role as exclusive representative;
individuals are allowed to disturb the internal process only
by showing that the system itself malfunctioned because the
union acted in an "arbitrary, discriminatory, or bad faith"
manner.3
We believe that this system is entirely appropriate. The
labor contract is a collective-bargaining agreement. It
creates rights for the entire bargaining unit; it is not an
individual contract for employment. The union is the elected
representative of the entire bargaining unit. The law
establishes many checks on the union's authority to act in
29. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
30. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135 (1991) (noting
that any "examination of a union's performance ... must be highly deferential"); see
also Ford Motor Co. v. Huffnan, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) (recognizing that because of
the diversity of interests in a union, bargaining representatives must be granted a
"wide range of reasonableness" when negotiating a labor contract).
31. See Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650,652 (1965); Smith v. Evening
News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 196 n.1, 200 (1962).
32. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-86, 190 (1967).
33. Id.
[VOL 25:3 & 4
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this representative capacity: the duty of fair representa-
tion;34 employees' ability to vote to decertify a union;' re-
quirements that unions operate democratically and allow
members equal rights to participate in union governance and
decision making;6 and, perhaps most importantly, the
requirement that union officials stand for election by secret
ballot, at least once every five years in the case of interna-
tional union officers, and at least once every three years in
the case of local union officials. 37
As long as these standards of conduct are met, a union has
discretion to act in the best interests of the employees that
it represents. In this context, the contractually mandated
process for resolving contractual disputes should not be
judged by its fidelity to "individual rights." Instead, the
values that the system is designed to promote are collective
rights, and the mechanism developed for that purpose must
be judged by that standard.
In short, where the law establishes a regime under which the
union and the employer are encouraged to reach a contract, and
thereafter leaves it to the parties to enforce their contractual
rights, the Board's role in such contract-enforcement procedures
is properly secondary to the mechanism chosen by the parties.
In this context, the chosen method for contract enforcement
does not derive its validity from being an adequate substitute
for agency enforcement of statutory rights. Instead, the
method derives its validity from the same mechanism that
generates the underlying standards of conduct themselves:
the labor agreement.
B. Statutory Rights and Private Procedures
Federal labor law not only encourages parties to bargain
and reach a contract, it also creates a web of individual
rights. Each individual employee has the right, for example,
to be free from employer retaliation based on his union
activities.38 These rights find their source in federal labor
law, not in a collective-bargaining agreement. Therefore,
34. Ford Motor Co., 345 U.S. at 338.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 159(cX1XAXii) (1988).
36. Id. § 411(aX1).
37. Id. § 481(a).
38. Id. § 158(aX3).
SPRING AND SUMNER 1992]
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where violations of these statutory rights are asserted, any
policy of deferral to private processes must rest on analytical
foundations entirely different from those outlined above. In
this context, deference must flow not from the observation
that the statutory rights have ceased to apply, but from the
observation that the private process provides an adequate
substitute for agency enforcement of the rights crafted by
Congress.
The Supreme Court examined an analogous issue in a trio
of cases and determined that arbitral awards should not be
given preclusive effect, even where the contract language
parallels the statutory or constitutional rights at issue.3 9
Instead, the Court determined that an arbitral award may be
given some weight when considering the alleged statutory
violation.4 ° The degree of weight will depend on a number of
factors, including the similarity between the normative
standard applied by the arbitrator and that mandated by the
statute, the procedural fairness of the proceedings, and the
qualifications of the private tribunal.41
When statutory protections are at stake, such deference, by
definition, runs the risk that the private mechanism will
operate in a way that diminishes statutory protections. Two
distinct areas of inquiry are therefore necessary. First, one
must determine whether the degree of potential damage to
the statutory protections has been minimized by ensuring
39. See McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 290-92 (1984); Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 742-45 (1981); Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974); see also Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475
U.S. 292, 308 n.20 (1986) (noting that "courts remain available as the ultimate
protectors of constitutional rights").
In a more recent series of cases, the Court has considered application of the Federal
Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-15, 201-08 (1988), to a variety of issues arising in
connection with individual employment contracts. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652 (1991); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483,489-93 (1987).
In general, the principle established in Gilmer is that-unless a contrary intent can be
found in the legislation creating the underlying statutory right-individual employees
are required to utilize arbitral proceedings, pursuant to the terms of their individual
contract for employment, before initiating litigation to enforce that statutory right. See
111 S. Ct. at 1652. The Court has yet to address the analog to post-arbitration deferral;
that is, whether, or in what circumstances, the results of that private process are to be
given weight in subsequent agency or judicial review. Instead, the Court has merely
indicated that post-arbitral review, "necessarily ... limited, [will be] sufficient to
ensure that arbitrators comply with the requirements of the statute' at issue." Id. at
1655 n.4 (quoting Shearson/American Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 232
(1987)).
40. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 60 n.21.
41. Id.; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 743.
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that the private processes both mimic the statutory stan-
dards at issue and provide an adequate level of procedural
fairness. Second, one must determine whether other policy
goals are served by a doctrine that allows some form of
deference, and, if so, whether achievement of those goals
outweighs the degree of damage to the statutory protections
likely to flow from deference to the private procedure.
As we attempted to establish in our original Article, the
Board's current rule fails the first inquiry.42  The Board's
present deferral policy includes no effort to ensure that the
damage to statutory rights is minimized. An allegation of
improper discharge, for example, will be deferred to the
arbitral proceedings without regard to whether the arbitrator
will review the employer's conduct under a standard similar
to that mandated by the statute.43
The Board's current deferral doctrine fails to recognize the
crucial distinction between statutory and contractual rights,
and proceeds instead from a simplistic desire to develop a
single rule that would apply to both circumstances. Having
framed its goal in this manner, the Board, we believe, was
doomed to failure from the start."
42. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 655-56.
43. See id. at 657 n.52. As we noted in our original Article, however, there are a
number of policy-based arguments that lend support to a policy of deferral. Federal
labor law always has favored private resolution of workplace disputes. Section 203(d)
of the LMRA provides: "Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is
declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes ... ." 29
U.S.C. § 173(d); see also Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 648 n.5 (discussing the
expansion of § 203(d) to stand for the general principle that federal labor policy favors
private resolution of all workplace disputes, not merely "grievance disputes").
In addition, the union's role is strengthened to the extent that the resolution
remains internal to the union-employer relationship and occurs without need for
external review by agencies or courts. Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 669. Finally,
all policies of deferral ease the docket of an overworked agency or judiciary. In our
view, however, these policies lend support to a deferral policy only if that policy first
makes an adequate effort to minimize the damage to statutory rights, as discussed in
the text. Because the Board's current policy makes no effort in this regard, we do not
believe that it should be salvaged by reference to these generalized policies. In short,
these policies could be used to justify virtually any form of deferral, and their presence
should not relieve the Board of its primary duty to ensure that the potential damage
to specific statutory protections has been eliminated or minimized.
44. Since our original Article, Judge Edwards again has sought to ground the
Board's deferral doctrine on a theory of waiver of statutory rights. See Plumbers &
Pipefitters Local Union No. 520 v. NLRB, 955 F.2d. 744 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Judge
Edwards begins by properly characterizing the Board's present deferral doctrine as
"vacuous ... because it lacks any coherent theoretical basis," id. at 746, but then
proceeds to remedy this deficiency by suggesting that, when a union and an employer
bargain for a contract (and agree to arbitrate disputes arising under that contract), they
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992]
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II. JOINT COMMITTEES, ARBITRATION, AND
CONTRACTUALISM
Most collective-bargaining agreements establish a griev-
ance procedure that culminates in a hearing before an
arbitrator selected by the employer and the union. That
arbitrator is charged with the responsibilities of interpreting
the contract and determining the rights of the parties
thereto. Although not bound by legal principles of contract
interpretation, most arbitrators apply traditional tools of
contract construction borrowed from legal methodology,45
adding to those an almost intuitive approach to the "law of
the shop." 6 In addition, arbitration proceedings, although
somewhat informal, share many characteristics with judicial
proceedings: witnesses are examined and cross-examined;
evidence is introduced; opening and closing statements are
made; and briefs are often submitted.47 The arbitrator then
reviews the evidence and the applicable contract language
and generally applies interpretive methods very much like
those developed under contract law.4
In contrast, under many collective-bargaining agreements
negotiated by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
disputes involving alleged violations of contractual standards
are subject to a grievance procedure that culminates in a
negotiation.' 9 Under this system, if the parties are unable to
resolve a contract dispute, the issue is referred to a "joint
committee" and the union is released from its no-strike
are implicitly waiving reliance on a broad range of statutory rights, see id at 751. As
in our original Article, we respectfully disagree. Waivers of statutory rights may be
found only if based on clear and unmistakable contract language. Metropolitan Edison
Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 709 (1983). In our experience, when the parties agree in
an arbitration clause that "disputes arising under this agreement" will be subject to
mandatory arbitration, and farther agree that the arbitrator has no authority to modify
the agreement but only to interpret it, they have neither considered waiving, nor
intended to waive, the background of statutory protections which are antecedent to that
contract. In such circumstances, therefore, we do not believe that a clear and
unmistakable waiver of those statutory rights can be shown.
45. FRANK ELKOUIa & EDNA A. ELKOURI, HOW ARBITRATION WORKS 396 (4th ed. 1985).
46. Id. at 141-42.
47. Id. at 267-69, 273-76.
48. Id. at 342-65.
49. See Levy, supra note 11, at 555-58.
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pledge.'s In that setting, the issue is resolved by traditional
collective-bargaining techniques: the union brings its
bargaining strength to bear on the issue by threatening the
employer with a strike if union demands are not met. Unlike
the arbitral model discussed above, the language of the
contract and its intended meaning, while perhaps bearing on
the parties' perceived bargaining strength, do not determine
the outcome of the dispute. Instead, the parties resolve their
dispute by recourse to bargaining (and its alternative, the
strike)."'
Central to Levy's analysis of these joint committee processes
is an assumed distinction between the union's "institutional"
interests and the employees' individual interests.52 Given this
thesis, it is not surprising that Levy sees little value in the
joint committee approach. The arbitral approach comes
much closer to fitting Levy's model of collective-bargaining
agreements that endow each employee with individual rights.
Levy would rather have arbitrators, acting like judges, read
and apply contract language than have the union, backed by
a strike threat, bargain on behalf of employees.ID This is a
policy choice which, as we will attempt to show, should have
50. See id. at 554-55. It appears that the employer is not similarly released from
its "no lock out" pledge. This, however, is not as asymmetrical as it might first appear.
The employer took the action that led to the dispute in the first place by allegedly
violating the contract. The union is in a wholly reactive position: it either strikes or
it does not. If it does not, the employer's conduct stands, and the employer has no
reason to stage a lock out. In short, the employer is not asking for anything from the
union except acquiescence to its unilateral conduct. The employer does not need the
affirmative lock-out weapon; it need only put the union in a position to choose between
striking and acquiescing. This it can do simply by unilaterally imposing the term or
condition of employment it seeks and thereby forcing the union to react.
51. In addition, after exhausting the grievance procedure, the union may sue
directly to enforce the substantive terms of the agreement without striking. Groves v.
Ring Screw Works, Ferndale Fastener Div., 111 S. Ct. 498, 503 (1990).
52. See Levy, supra note 11, at 535.
53. Several labor scholars may have come to the opposite conclusion: that the
union should routinely determine the propriety of employer conduct by resort to the
strike weapon rather than by a resort to a written contract. The contract-based ap-
proach, according to one of these writers, has led to "the domestication and decline of
[the] labour movement." Staughton Lynd, Trade Unionism in the USA, NEW LEFT REV.,
Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 76, 81 (reviewing DAVID MONTGOMERY, THE FALL OF THE HOUSE OF
LABOR (1987) and KIM MOODY, AN INQUIRY To ALu THE DECLINE OF AMERICAN UNIONISM
(1988)). Another writer argues, "To place the contract somehow above the realm of...
human action and class interaction is to miss the dual character of class relations in
the workplace." Kim Moody, A Reply to Staughton Lynd, NEW LEFT REV., Nov.-Dec.
1990, at 87, 92. Nevertheless, Moody concludes that the contract and the grievance
procedure do have benefits in that they 'provide a legitimizing focus around which to
conduct resistance or organize struggle.* Id.
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no bearing on the degree of deference properly afforded to the
parties' chosen mechanism in cases involving section 8(a)(5)
and contractual rights.
A. Deferral in the Context of Contractual Rights
When the underlying rights at issue are those created by
the labor agreement itself, the joint committee resolution
mechanism is no less deserving of deference than the arbitral
mechanism. As noted in Part I, when contract rights and the
duty to bargain are the only issues contested, the existence
of a contract covering a certain element of employer behavior
completely ends the legal analysis; section 8(a)(5) has served
its purpose and there are no longer any rights at stake other
than those specifically created by the contract.5 In that
context, whether the mechanism for determining the scope of
those contractual rights is arbitration or a joint committee
acting under the threat of a strike makes absolutely no
difference. In both cases, the contract has created the rights
at issue, and the contractual procedures provide the final
answer as to the scope of those rights.5
The same analysis also applies to negotiated resolutions of
contractual disputes. Virtually all grievance procedures
require that parties attempt to negotiate a resolution to their
dispute before submitting it to arbitration or to the joint
committee.5 When these efforts end in resolution, as they do
in the vast majority of cases, that negotiated result (just like
the arbitral decision or the joint committee determination) is
the final word on the contract and its meaning. 7 As such,
that result deserves the same kind of deference, and should
54. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
55. This analysis assumes that the procedure for interpreting the contract-
whatever it may be-has operated without a breach of the union's duty of fair
representation. That duty ensures that the procedure will operate with an assured
level of fairness. See infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
56. David E. Feller, A General Theory of the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 61
CAL. L. REV. 663, 745 (1973).
57. See General Drivers, Local Union No. 89 v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519
(1963) (per curiam) ("Thus, if the [decision of the contractually created committee] is
the parties' chosen instrument for the definitive settlement of grievances under the
Agreement, it is enforceable under § 301 [of the LMRA].").
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be challenged only by a showing that the process was tainted
by a breach of the union's duty of fair representation.6
One might argue that this analysis would allow the union
and the employer to agree upon any sort of dispute resolution
mechanism and endow it with equal force. That is correct.
The only caveat to this conclusion is that the union must
always be constrained by its duty of fair representation.
Imagine, for example, that a union and an employer agreed
that work on Sundays would be paid at double the normal
rate and that disputes under the contract would be resolved
by an arm-wrestling contest between the union steward and
the supervisor. When an employee is paid at his normal (as
opposed to the contractually required double time) rate for
Sunday work, is his remedy to assert an individual contract
right to double time? No. His remedy is to show that the
union acted arbitrarily in negotiating the contract itself.5 9
Levy does recognize, somewhat begrudgingly, that a joint
committee process, like an arbitration-based process, de-
serves deference when contractual rights are at issue.6°
Levy, however, clearly prefers arbitration's more adjudicatory
approach, even in this context. For example, in the brief
discussion in which he admits that deference is proper in this
context "as a matter of law," he also refers to the joint
committee approach as "a quick and dirty way of deciding
how those [contractual] rights ought to be applied," and
asserts that doing so "decreas[es] fairness to the employ-
ees."6' Levy's views reflect two underlying assumptions: that
the union's "institutional" interests are distinct from those of
58. See, e.g., Alpha Beta Co., 273 N.L.R.B. 1546, 1547 (1985) (stating that arbitral
deferral principles articulated in Olin apply equally to settlements "because they
further the national labor policy which favors private resolution of labor disputes"),
petition for review denied sub. norn. Mahon v. NLRB, 808 F.2d 1342, 1345-46 (9th Cir.
1987).
59. For a discussion of the standards established by the duty of fair representation
in the context of negotiation, as opposed to administration, of collective-bargaining
agreements, see Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1133-35 (1991).
While we are not aware of any case directly on point, we believe that the employee may
also be excused from the requirement of exhausting the procedure if he can show that
the procedure itself violates the duty of fair representation. Cf Clayton v. UAW, 451
U.S. 679, 689 (1981) (stating that internal union procedures must meet certain
thresholds of fairness and adequacy of relief before exhaustion is required). Only such
a showing-like the showing that the union violated that duty in handling a particular
grievance-should relieve the employee of the duty to exhaust the contractually
mandated procedure for determining and enforcing rights created by the contract.
60. See Levy, supra note 11, at 567.
61. Id
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the employees it represents, and that the arbitration model
provides an increased level of "fairness" by using an adjudi-
catory tribunal that at least pays lip service to the existence
of individual rights arising under the contract.
Levy backs up the first of these assumptions with anecdotal
evidence.6 2 Obviously, we will not argue that unions never err
nor that some union officials are never motivated by improper
concerns. Levy, however, does not indicate why he believes
that the duty of fair representation is insufficient to guard
against these problems, or why it is necessary to contort the
collective-bargaining agreement into a series of individual
contracts of employment in order to guarantee "fairness" and
avoid "quick and dirty" enforcement of contract rights. The
second assumption reflects Levy's preference for a juridical
model of allocating power in the workplace. Levy apparently
believes an adjudicatory approach provides greater "fairness"
simply because individual employees, looking out for their
own self-interest, are given a greater role to play. Levy does
not even examine, however, the possibility that employees
acting collectively, by threatening or conducting a strike,
could obtain an equal or greater level of "fairness."
B. Deferral in the Context of Statutory Rights
Analysis of negotiated or joint committee determinations
is entirely different when considering deferral in the context
of statutory rights. As discussed in Part I, deference is
justified in this context only to the extent that the private
mechanism is an adequate substitute for agency or judicial
consideration of the substantive statutory standards at issue,
and when it is bolstered by other beneficial policies served
by such deference.63 Here it makes little sense to defer to a
process of negotiation or a joint committee decision; there is
no reason to believe that either provides an adequate substi-
tute for judicial scrutiny of employer conduct. When an
arbitrator is called upon to interpret contract language that
parallels the statutory language at issue, however, the
62. Id. at 480-92.
63. See supra notes 38-44 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has held that an arbitral decision may be
given weight in a subsequent judicial proceeding."
The Board's original deferral policy at least partially recog-
nized this distinction between appropriate deferral analysis
in the context of statutory, as opposed to contractual, rights.
In Collyer Insulated Wire," the Board deferred a section
8(a)(5) dispute to arbitral processes because in such cases
"[t]he contract and its meaning... lie at the center of th[e]
dispute."" Subsequently, however, the Board attempted to
craft a uniform rule governing deferral, no matter whether
the underlying violation concerned section 8(a)(5)'s bargain-
ing requirements or an allegation that the employer violated
the substantive statutory mandates of section 8(a)(3). 67 Most
disturbingly, the Board held that-even in cases involving
section 8(a)(3)'s substantive protections-the arbitrator's
decision need not "be totally consistent with Board prece-
dent," but will be deemed worthy of deferral as long as it is
not "palpably wrong."' This deferential standard plainly
fails to ensure that the contractual standard of conduct
applied by the arbitrator parallels the standard that would
be applied by the Board were it to consider the charge
directly. Although there is no reason to inquire into that
parallelism in the context of duty-to-bargain charges where
the rights are purely contractual, the failure to do so in the
context of a section 8(a)(3) dispute means that employees
have lost all access to Board enforcement of those important
substantive protections.
64. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
65. 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971).
66. Id at 842.
67. See, e.g., Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 573, 574 (1984) ([Dlifferences, if any,
between the contractual and statutory standards of review should be weighed by the
Board as part of its determination... of whether an award is 'clearly repugnant' to the
Act."); United Technologies Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. 557, 559 (1984) ("Where an employer
and a union have voluntarily elected to create dispute resolution machinery culminat-.
ing in final and binding arbitration, it is contrary to the basic principles of the Act for
the Board to jump into the fray prior to an honest attempt by the parties to resolve
their disputes through that machinery.").
68. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B. at 574.
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III. DEFERRAL TO INTERNAL UNION PROCEDURES
AND THE DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION
The duty of fair representation establishes the minimum
level of fair play required by a union in all its activity.69 As
such, it is a right that flows to individual employees from
federal law rather than from a contract. Deferral to a
private dispute resolution process in this context, therefore,
cannot be justified by the observations described above
regarding the special nature of section 8(a)(5) and the duty
to bargain. Like other statutory protections, parties do not
waive the duty of fair representation merely because they
have executed a collective-bargaining agreement. 70 As with
other statutory rights, any deferral to private dispute
resolution mechanisms can be justified only by reference to
the two inquiries described in Part IB: (1) whether the
private process will apply substantive and procedural
standards similar to those mandated by the law and thus
ensure that the potential damage to statutory rights has
been minimized; and, if so, (2) whether other beneficial poli-
cies are furthered by deference.71
The first of these inquiries, we believe, should parallel the
Supreme Court's determination that a private arbitral award
determination may not be given preclusive effect but may,
under appropriate circumstances, be given weight in a subse-
quent agency or judicial review. 72 The most important factor
in determining the degree of such weight should be the
extent to which the private process mimics both the substan-
tive standards and the procedural safeguards fashioned by
Congress. In short, deferral here is justifiable only to the
extent that the private tribunal represents an adequate
substitute for the legal procedures otherwise available.
Although our analysis, like the Supreme Court's, never
would result in the decision of a private tribunal being given
"preclusive" effect in subsequent litigation, it may result in
69. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1991) (holding
that the rule announced in Vaca-that a union breaches its duty of fair representation
if its actions are either "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith"-applies to all union
activity, including contract negotiation).
70. See supra note 44.
71. See supra p. 934-36 .
72. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
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an agency or court giving substantial weight to those
procedures and their results in the proper circumstances.73
Before discussing the specific statutory standards involved
in the duty of fair representation, we outline briefly some of
the policies which a rule giving substantial weight to private
internal union processes in this context would further.
Where appropriate, we also note the distinctions between
application of these policies in the context of internal union
procedures and in the context of collectively bargained
grievance procedures. We then discuss the statutory stan-
dards of the duty of fair representation.
A. Policy Goals
Among the potential justifications for a policy of deferral is
the observation that until the private process has proceeded
to its conclusion, the challenged action may be reversed; the
private process may provide full (or even partial) relief to the
complaining party who may, therefore, decline to seek agency
or judicial review. Stated in general form, this observation
clearly applies to any process of private dispute resolution.
This policy has two component parts. First, by staying its
hand, the agency may reduce its docket simply because the
dispute might be resolved to the complaining party's satis-
faction without the need for agency or judicial intervention.
As the Supreme Court has noted, arbitration often serves a
"therapeutic" function by allowing the union or the employee
to air the grievance and receive a determination.74 Providing
73. In the case of § 8(aX3), for example, we argued in our original Article that the
Board's current policy of broad deference is incorrect. See Page & Sherrick, supra note
1, at 658-68. In contrast to our approach, the Board currently makes no effort to
determine that the collective-bargaining agreement at issue protects the same
categories of behavior that the statute was designed to protect. Id at 661-63. Instead,
all that it requires is that the dispute presented to the private tribunal is 'factually
parallel" to that which the parties would have presented to the Board and that the
arbitrator was "presented generally" with the relevant facts. Olin Corp., 268 N.L.R.B.
573, 574 (1984). Moreover, rather than attempt a case-by-case analysis of the amount
of weight to be given to the decision of the private tribunal, the Board has approached
the problem by attempting to erect a threshold analysis: so long as that tribunars
decision is not "palpably wrong" when considered in light of the statutory commands,
the Board will refuse to intercede. Id-
74. See United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 568 & n.6 (1960).
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employees or the union with their "day in court," albeit
before an arbitrator rather than an agency, serves this
therapeutic function. This observation, however, applies
broadly to any deferral policy, and, by itself, hardly compels
removal of statutory protections. 75
Second, when an agency or court allows the private pro-
cesses an opportunity to work, and gives their decision some
degree of weight in a subsequent agency or judicial review,
the entity responsible for maintaining that private mecha-
nism has an incentive to operate it effectively and to take
pride in its integrity. This incentive effect, however, works
only to the extent that the degree of weight or deference
given to the decision varies depending upon the integrity of
the private process. A universal rule setting a single level of
deference will not reward those entities that establish more
complete and neutral systems of internal review. Nor will a
single standard punish those entities that fail to establish
such a system.
This incentive effect, as we argued in our original Article, is
more compelling in the context of internal union procedures
than in collectively bargained dispute resolution mechanisms. 76
In collective bargaining, the parties agree to a system of
private dispute resolution with a view toward enforcing the
rights they have created in their contract. The processes are
designed to resolve contractual disputes, not to provide a
general level of fair treatment nor to substitute for statutory
75. In general, we have refrained here from distinguishing between arguments in
favor of deferral prior to a decision by the private tribunal, as developed in Collyer
Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971), and deferral or deference applied to the
results of that private process after its conclusion, as developed in Spielberg
Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955). As Levy points out, there are some
differences between the Board's rationales for these distinct doctrines. See Levy, supra
note 11, at 494-95, 501. In fact, one of the justifications, the "ripeness" or finality
argument-that the decision remains capable of reversal until it has received all the
review that is available--applies only to pre-arbitral deferral and does not advance the
inquiry into whether that decision, once made, should be given weight by a reviewing
court or agency.
Nevertheless, we believe that most of the arguments advanced in the text apply
equally whether the question arises before or after the private tribunal has reached its
conclusion. In addition, we believe that there are strong reasons to prefer a policy that
is "symmetrical" in that it either (1) both requires exhaustion and gives weight to the
private decision or (2) allows the aggrieved individual immediate access to an agency
or judicial forum and applies statutory protections without regard to the results of
private review processes. It hardly makes sense to require exhaustion of a private
process and then ignore the result.
76. See Page & Sherrick, supra note 1, at 684 n.168.
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rights. In addition, because these processes are the result of
collective bargaining, they are neither designed exclusively
by nor uniquely associated with either the employer or the
union. Given these features of the environment in which
these contractual procedures are developed, we do not believe
that varying the levels of deference to collectively bargained
arbitral processes would give the parties sufficient incentive
to redesign the processes to obtain the greater degree of
deference when statutory rights are at issue.
Internal union procedures are designed differently. They
are not created to enforce particular contractual rights.
Instead, their purposes are broader: preventing abuses by
individual union officials and in general "[pirotecting the
democratic rights of [union] members ... [and] minimiz[ing]
the possibility that these democratic rights are undermined
in any way."77 Moreover, the union creates these procedures
on its own, and, therefore, is directly identified with them
and the quality and integrity of their operation. For these
reasons, we believe that a policy of deference to internal
union procedures is much more likely to achieve the benefits
of encouraging responsible self-government than would a
similar policy of deference to collectively bargained arbitral
remedies.78
In addition to these incentives for union officials, a policy
of varying deferral in this context also would have an effect
77. Owen Bieber, Foreword to PUBLIC REVIEW BOARD, 33RD ANNUALREPORT TO THE
MEMBERI OF THE UNITED AurOMoBILF AEROSPACE AND AGiCULURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA 2 (1990) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
78. In his Response, Levy speculates that a policy of deference to an internal union
appeal mechanism might reduce the incentive that front-line union officers have to
provide quality representation. See Levy, supra note 8, at 914. Levy's argument in this
regard would have some force if the fear of duty-of-fair-representation liability were the
only motivating factor for local union officers. Happily, that is not the case. Local union
officers are elected by the individuals they represent. 29 U.S.C. § 481. In our judg-
ment, they would be unlikely to be reelected if their approach were to simply pass
responsibility to a higher union body or, worse, to make decisions adverse to their
constituencies only to have those decisions reversed by internal appellate mechanisms.
Moreover, in the UAW's internal appeal procedure, the first step is to present the
matter to the membership of the appellant's localunion. INTERNATIONAL UNION, UNITED
AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE & AGRICuL RAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST.
art. 33, § 2 (1989). The union official who has refused to pursue a grievance or who has
taken other action which is the subject of an appeal therefore always must be prepared
to defend her decision before the membership body which has the ability to vote her out
of office. In our experience, these factors provide much greater motivation for honest
and zealous representation than the threat of union liability under the duty of fair
representation.
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on union members' selection of their representatives, which,
after all, is done by secret ballot. As the Ninth Circuit
recently noted, "Democratic processes atrophy when they are
not exercised; union members will have no interest in
improving their organizations' internal adjustment proce-
dures if they never are required to use them." '
Union members' ability to influence the review procedures
adopted by their union also distinguishes this situation from
that of the employer who promulgates unilateral procedures.
Obviously, employees do not elect their employer. Requiring
employees to use unilaterally promulgated employer tribu-
nals and then deferring to the resulting decision therefore
will not facilitate any helpful input from the end-user of that
procedure (the employee) as to the rules of, or standards to
be applied by, that tribunal. Instead, such a requirement
would serve only to allow the employer, by promulgating
such policies, to avoid statutory scrutiny of his actions.s°
B. Statutory Standards
Any policy of deferring, or even giving weight, to the results
of private dispute resolution processes runs the risk of
diminishing statutory protections. No matter how significant
the other benefits of deferral are in terms of docket control,
self-governance, incentive effects, or the promotion of the private
resolution of disputes in general, we believe that no deferral
policy should stand if it systematically diminishes statutory
protections. In order to determine whether the potential
damage to statutory rights is too great to be tolerated, we must
inquire into the nature of those statutory rights and the
standards applied by the private processes. As we attempt
to show, the duty of fair representation is an excellent candidate
79. Ackley v. Western Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463, 1478 (9th Cir.
1992) (quoting Wiglesworth v. Teamsters Local Union No. 592,552 F.2d 1027,1031 (4th
Cir. 1976) (quoting Benjamin Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959, 73 HARV. L. REV. 851, 869 (1960)), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 955 (1977))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
80. The incentives in such a system are perverse. The employer would have an
obvious interest in establishing a procedure that accomplished the desired, and legal,
result of preventing litigation, but would also seek a procedure with maximum bias
against employee claims. Moreover, as noted in the text, the employees have no
opportunity to influence the design of such procedures.
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for deferral to properly constituted internal union procedures
applying proper normative standards.
To begin our discussion of the statutory rights at issue in
the duty-of-fair-representation cases, we first propose a
distinction between two types of statutory rights. We charac-
terize these two different kinds of statutory rights as follows:
(1) those providing a narrow focus and strong protection in an
otherwise nondemocratic relationship; and (2) those providing
a broad focus and generalized protection in a relationship which
is already required to be democratic.
The first category of rights are derived from statutes serving
one of three functions: (1) protecting a certain category of
behavior from private or state retaliation;sl (2) protecting
persons from discrimination based on specific attributes such
as race or gender;' or (3) regulating the relations between
private parties by establishing certain substantive terms which
must be incorporated into those relationships. 3
The second category of statutory requirements dictate with
much less specificity the ordering of relations between private
parties. They require only that the parties develop private
processes which meet some minimum level of good faith,
rationality, or responsiveness to the body of represented
individuals. The duty to bargain, for example, requires only
that the parties develop a process for bargaining; the contours
of that process-as well as its result-are intentionally left
to the parties' own discretion. s4
81. Section 8(a)(3), which protects employees from employer discrimination based
on union activities, is the example closest at hand. Other examples in the labor field
include state statutes which prohibit employer retaliation forfiling workers' compensation
claims or asserting other substantive rights. See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 132a(1) (West
1989) (prohibiting employer discrimination against an employee who applies for
adjudication with the appeals board); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:1361(B) (West 1985)
(forbidding employer discharge of employees who file worker's compensation claims);
MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 15.362 (West 1981) (prohibiting employer discrimination against
employees who report violations of state or federal law); see also Lingle v. Norge Div.
of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399,406 (1988) (referring to the Illinois common-law tort
of retaliatory discharge for filing a workers' compensation claim).
82. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988)(makingit anunlawful employmentpractice
to discriminate in the workplace on the bases of race, color, sex, religion, or national
origin).
83. The Fair Labor Standards Act, for instance, establishes minimum-wage levels
and requires that overtime work be compensated in a certain fashion regardless of any
other contractual provision which exists between the employer and the employees or
their representative. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1988).
84. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
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The duty of fair representation, we believe, fits within this
second category of less specific statutory rights. It does not
attempt to dictate the substantive terms of the relationship
between the union and its members; nor does it single out
particular categories of individual behavior for strong pro-
tection.' Instead, the duty of fair representation serves as
a further check on potential abuse in a process that is already
required to operate democratically. But, importantly, the
specific contours of the relationship between the elected union
officials and the membership are otherwise left to the discre-
tion of the members and their elected representatives.8
This type of broadly focused, statutory right demonstrates
a healthy respect for the self-determination of the regulated
groups. Unlike a minimum-wage law, it does not dictate with
specificity the terms of that private relationship. Nor does
it intrude into a nondemocratic private relationship in order
to specify a narrowly defined category of behavior for
protection. As in all laws, of course, there is an undeniable
degree of compulsion involved in the duty of fair representa-
tion. Nevertheless, the law exercises that compulsion only to
ensure that a privately designed, democratic relationship
between the union and its members will function in a manner
that is not "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith."8
In contrast, labor statutes in the first category regulate
conduct with a much different goal: to protect certain specified
categories of behavior from employer retaliation. For example,
section 8(aX3) prohibits employers from retaliating against
employees for the purpose of encouraging or discouraging
membership in alabor organization.8 Congress determined that,
in these circumstances, the law must intrude narrowly into a
private, and otherwise nondemocratic, relationship "by placing
certain enumerated restrictions on the activities of employers"'
in order to provide strong and absolute employee protection. 90
The need for this intrusion can be attributed, at least partly,
to the nondemocratic nature of the employer/employee
85. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1135-36 (1991).
86. IL
87. 1l at 1130; Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
88. 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX3) (1988).
89. American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 316 (1965).
90. The Supreme Court stated, 'The central purpose of[ §§ 8(a)(1), (3), and(5)] was
to protect employee self-organization and the process of collective bargaining from
disruptive interferences by employers." Il at 317.
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relationship. No natural checks and balances operate to
moderate the potential mischief which employers might seek
to visit upon their employees.91 The law, therefore, is the only
mechanism that provides at least some measure of employee
protection in this context.
Both the goal and the context of the duty of fair representation
are different. The goal is to provide a more generalized form of
protection that reaches broadly into the private relationship. 92
Virtually all forms of union conduct are subject to scrutiny under
the duty of fair representation. 93 The protection that scrutiny
affords, however, is focused much less sharply on any
particular type of protected behavior. Further, the duty of fair
representation arises in a more democratic context. As
previously noted, employees elect union officials by secret
ballot. These elected officials are then charged specifically
with the duty of representing their members. 94 In this
circumstance, employees already enjoy, and properly so, a
significant ability to influence their representatives' conduct.
If employees feel that their interests are not being adequately
represented, they are free to defeat the current leadership,
run for office themselves, or decertify the union altogether.
Obviously, employees possess none of these democratic rights
when confronting an employer.95 This distinction, we believe,
indicates that deferral is more appropriate in the context of
procedures adopted by democratically controlled and represen-
tative bodies such as unions than in the context of procedures
unilaterally adopted by employers whose interests are, after
all, generally antithetical to employees in this context.
91. We recognize that the employment relationship remains "voluntary" in the sense
that employees can always quit their jobs. Particularly in an era of high unemployment
and decreasing real wages, however, this "right" is more formal than real. Even if an
employee could hope to find a comparable job, there are other costs of quitting a job:
one might be forced to sever important social ties developed through work; abandon
benefits such as health insurance, pension plans, or accrued vacation; or even relocate.
In any event, it need only be noted here that the employer retains the ability to compel
an employee to either endure the terms of employment offered or face the significant
costs of terminating that relationship. A union, in contrast, can be forced to change its
policies when its members express that preference through the ballot box.
92. See Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Int'l, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1134-35 (1991) (stating that
the duty applies to union negotiation, as well as to the administration, of a collective-
bargaining agreement).
93. 1&
94. See supra text accompanying notes 34-37.
95. See supra note 91. The ability to quit, like the ability to leave one's nation and
adopt citizenship elsewhere, is hardly comparable to the right to influence, through demo-
cratic means, the policies or conduct of one's employer.
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C. Deferral Policy in Light of the Type of
Statutory Right in Issue
Section 8(a)(3) and the other forms of highly specific
statutory rights are poor candidates for deferral. In those
instances, Congress has determined that the agency or the
judiciary must ensure that certain narrowly defined categories
of conduct are free from retaliation. The right at issue is, in
a true sense, an individual right. The statute does not
envision a balancing of interests or a broad perspective on the
totality of a relationship. Instead, it decrees that particular
conduct is protected from reprisal in all circumstances. 96
Moreover, these protections occur in the context of a relation-
ship that is otherwise wholly lacking in any of the significant
mechanisms that a democratic structure provides to ensure
fair treatment.
97
The duty of fair representation, as noted above, establishes
a more broadly focused and process-oriented standard.98 It
is designed to ensure that the private relationship between
the union and its members adheres to a broadly defined stan-
dard of fairness. As the Supreme Court has noted recently,
duty-of-fair-representation charges can be evaluated only by
considering the "factual and legal landscape at the time of the
union's actions" to determine whether the union acted
reasonably.99 In this context, the presence of an internal
review mechanism is entirely relevant to the merits of the
underlying claim. When the union voluntarily subjects its
conduct to review by a tribunal which is capable of reversing
the union's determination, the very availability of that tribunal
is relevant to the inquiry of whether the employee has been
96. For example, § 8(aX3) unequivocally states that an employer engages in an unfair
labor practice when she, "by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment... encourage[s] or discourage[s] membership
in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1988).
97. This is not to suggest that an arbitral decision in this context is in all instances
to be given absolutely no weight in subsequent agency or judicial action. Ifthe arbitral
proceeding resolves factual disputes, or applies contractual provisions which are closely
similar to the applicable statutory standard, there is no reason that the agency or the
court must remain wholly uninterested in the results of that process. Any weight given
to the arbitral result in this context, however, must be justified by specific observations
about the quality of the process involved or the similarity of the standards applied and
should not flow from any universal policy of deferral which ignores these factors.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 92-95.
99. Air Line Pilots Ass'n, Intl v. O'Neill, 111 S. Ct. 1127, 1130 (1991).
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afforded fair and reasonable treatment. In addition, the
substantive legal right in controversy here, in contrast to the
right at issue pursuant to section 8(a)(3), is the right to a fair
and adequate process of representation. °°
Moreover, as previously noted, democratic mechanisms
already govern the union/member relationship.0 ° The law
requires that members have a significant voice in the nature
of the institution, its governing principles and priorities, and
the identity of its leadership. 1° To allow statutory protections
to be subsumed into internal processes presents a very differ-
ent question when a democratically elected body creates those
internal processes. When an employer promulgates such
policies, he is doing so unilaterally and a desire to avoid
litigation may be his primary, if not his sole, motivation.' °
When a union promulgates internal review mechanisms, in
contrast, it is motivated by a desire to be responsive to the
membership which, after all, retains the ultimate ability to
elect new leaders or to abandon the union altogether.
None of the foregoing is meant to suggest, however, that the
NLRB or the courts should always defer to any internal union
procedure. When statutory rights are at stake, the agency or
court must also evaluate the procedure based on its adherence
to normative standards of conduct closely resembling those
mandated by Congress. We do not intend to obviate the need
for this inquiry by observing that the duty of fair representa-
tion arises in a unique context. Instead, we wish only to
demonstrate that the nature of the statutory rights at issue,
coupled with democratically controlled unions, make duty-of-
fair-representation allegations better candidates for deferral
than allegations that an employer has violated the specific
statutory commands of section 8(a)(3).'04
100. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177 (1967) ("[A]s the exclusive bargaining
representative of the employees[,]... the Union had a statutory duty fairly to represent
all of those employees ... ."); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953)
(1IB]argaining representatives['] .... statutory obligation to represent all members of
an appropriate unit requires them to make an honest effort to serve the interests of all
of those members, without hostility to any.").
101. See supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
102. 29 U.S.C. §§ 159, 411, 481.
103. See supra note 80.
104. For the same reasons, most types of charges under the Labor Management
Reporting Disclosure Act (Iandrum-Griffin Act) would also be good candidates for deferral.
There, as in the duty-of-fair-representation context, the law is designed to guarantee
a fair process within the context of a democratic organization. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531
(1988).
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D. The UAW Constitution
With that much as background, we now briefly survey the
internal union procedures found in the United Auto Workers
Constitution of the International Union UAW'0 5 and attempt
to show that they provide adequate standards of both proce-
dural and substantive fairness, thereby deserving deference.
The UAW Constitution provides a level of procedural fairness
comparable to that supplied by either the NLRB or a federal
district court when it considers a duty-of-fair-representation
case. Thus, under their Constitution, UAW members are free
to participate in hearings, first before the membership of their
local union, and then before a committee selected by the
International Executive Board (IEB). 1° Members then have
the option to appeal IEB decisions before either the Public
Review Board (PRB) or the Convention Appeals Committee
(CAC).'07 The PRB consists of distinguished individuals with
no institutional ties to the UAW and, therefore, provides a
neutral forum for resolution of these disputes.' The CAC is
composed of local union delegates chosen at random from the
UAW Convention, the Union's highest authority.'1 9 These
individuals are elected by their regional union membership
and have no other institutional ties to the International
Union." 0
Under the UAW Constitution, the private tribunal applies
a substantive standard closely parallel to that mandated by
the duty of fair representation. Thus, while the duty of fair
representation requires that the union act in ways that are
not "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,""' the UAW
Constitution directs one of its internal tribunals of last resort,
the PRB, to review union decisions whenever a complaining
105. INTRNATIONAL UNION, UNITEDAUIUMOBII, AEROSPACE & AGRCUJLRAL IMMENT
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 33, § 2 (1989) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
106. Id. art. 33, § 3.
107. Id. art. 33, § 3(e)-(f).
108. Id. art. 32, §§ 1-2; see Monroe v. International Union, UAW, 723 F.2d 22, 24
n.3 (6th Cir. 1983) (noting that the PRB "is, according to uncontradicted evidence, an
independent group of academic and social agency persons with no UAW affiliation").
109. INTERNATIONALUNION, UN DAUDMOBIIHARACE & AGICUL'RALIPEMEN
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST. art. 33, § 3(e) (1989) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
110. Id.
111. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967).
[VOL 25:3 & 4
SPRING AND SUMMER 1992] Further Thoughts on Deferral 953
member shows that the matter was "improperly handled
because of fraud, discrimination or collusion with management,
or that the disposition or handling Of the matter was devoid
of any rational basis.""2
CONCLUSION
We believe that where the union has subjected its own
conduct to review by a neutral body, applying a standard of
conduct very similar to that mandated by the duty of fair
representation, both the Board and the judiciary should show
that procedure the respect it is owed. We are not, however,
arguing for a "rule" of deference like that currently applied
by the Board to employer/employee grievance procedures.
Instead, we argue only that both the Board and the courts
should examine the quality of the internal review provided by
a union and give the results of that procedure a significant
degree of weight in subsequent litigation when, as in the case
of the UAW, that tribunal supplies standards of procedural
and substantive fairness which closely mimic those provided
in the statute.
112. INTERN'ATONAL UNION, UNIMTDAtnoMOBILFAE"ACE & AGPICUL'niRAL bPLM
WORKERS OF AMERICA, UAW, CONST., art. 33, § 4(i) (1989) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). The other internal tribunal, the Convention Appeals
Committee, is empowered to review IEB decisions without a showing of fraud,
discrimination, collusion, or irrationality. See id. § 3e.

